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OTHER KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE....
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source of valid knowledge. Cārvākas contend that upamana is not a pramāņa at all. The Buddhists reduce upamāna to perception and testimony. The sankhya reduces it to inference. Mimāmsakās and Vedāntins though recognize upamāna as a separate source of knowledge, they explain it in a different way.
Nyaya rejects Vedanta and Mīmāmsă view that reasoning about likeness and unlikeness are obtained through upamana. Nyāya contention is that in all cases of upamāna, we compare the unfamiliar object with something familiar.
In Jainism, upamāna is not recognized as an independent source of knowledge but it is included under pratyabhijñā or recognition. Jainas use concept of pratyabhijñā in a wider sense to include all the kinds of judgement like 'this is like that', 'this is unlike that' etc. In other words in Jainism pratyabhijñā includes any knowledge which is conditioned by perception and memory. It includes any knowledge which is conditioned by perception and memory. It includes Mīmāmsā-Vedānta as well as Nyaya view of upamāna.
In this connection, it may be pointed out that Jaina view is not accepted by all. The critics think that the view that upamāna is a form of pratyabhijñā is based on wrong assumption. "They seem to think that a knowledge is explained when we explain the constituent parts of it. But to explain the component parts of knowledge is not to explain knowledge itself. To say that it is so is the fundamental error of all associationist theory of knowledge. It is were really so, the Jaina view of pratyabhijñā itself as a distinct type of knowledge will have to be discarded since it is constituted by perception
Nyȧ.-7
