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NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
of universal concomitance which consists in necessary occurance of determinant concomitant i. e. major term on the occurance of determinate concomitant, i. e. middle term.
Thinkers of other systems refuse to admit the validity of inductive reasoning as a separate source of knowledge. But Jainism points out that tarka or induction should be regarded as an independent means of knowledge because in
the knowledge of the relation of two things is acquired. Jains admit that it arises from the facts of perception and non-perception but Vyapti is known through a distinct source of knowledge called tarka. Knowledge of universal concomitance cannot be derived from perception alone since perception is limited whereas knowledge of universal concomitance is unlimited. Again, it cannot be maintained that such knowledge is obtained by inference, since inference itself is not possible without universal concomitance. Jainas further point out that to deny the validity of induction would lead to agnosticism which is an impossible position.
It, therefore, follows that inductive reasoning or tarka is an independent means of knowledge of universal concomitance which cannot be apprehended by any other recognised means of knowledge.
Naiyāyikās do not accept tarka as a pramāņa but regard it as pramāṇa-sahāyaka (helper).
Recollection
Smrti is the third kind of non-perceptual knowledge. It should be noted that Jainism and Madhva, among all the systems of Indian philosophy, regard recollection as a valid and separate means of knowledge.
