Nyaya And Jaina Epistemology

Author(s): Kokila H Shah
Publisher: Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

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NYĀYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
of knowledge as found in the works of important Jaina logicians like Siddha-Sena and Deva-Sūri show a remarkable difference from those given in early works of Jaina logic like Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigama sūtra’. For example, the definition of direct knowledge is modified. It is defined as that which refers to the object presented to the senses.
Jaina Epistemology as discussed in Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākar
Nyāyāvatār is a small work which contains logical and epistemological views of Siddhasena Divākara-a Jaina logician. He defines knowledge as that which is free from obstruction and which illuminates itself and other things. It can be either direct knowledge or indirect knowledge. Ordinary direct knowledge is that which perceives the objects which are not beyond the senses. This definition of direct knowledge is in contrast with that found in the earlier Jaina works. Inference is defined as the knowledge of the major term through a mark which is inseparably connected with it. Verbal testimony is defined as knowledge arising from words. It also discusses the doctrine of Naya and Syādvāda.
Pramāṇanaya Tattvālokālankāra of Vādi Deva Sūri
It is an important treatise on Jaina logic and epistemology. It defines Pramāņa as valid knowledge about the self and the not-self. It is opposed to superimposition. It is either direct or indirect. Direct knowledge is clear and vivid while indirect knowledge is not clear. Direct knowledge is again of two types :i. knowledge in the ordinary sense; ii. knowledge in the highest sense.