Book Title: Nyaya And Jaina Epistemology Author(s): Kokila H Shah Publisher: Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research CentrePage 56
________________ COMMON SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE.... 39 Here, Nyāya seems to recognize the fundamental fact about knowledge that it involves both sensation and conception. The extreme view held by some of the systems like Cārvaka and Visiştādvaita Vedānta of Rāmānuja that all perception is determinate is difficult to accept. Most of the Jaina logicians also accept both these forms of the perception. Nyāya while recognizing these two forms of perception; makes it clear that same reality is presented at indeterminate stage which is there at the determinate stage of perception. Recognition The third variety of the ordinary perception is termed as pratyabhijñā which is re-cognition of same object. It is cognition of an object as that which was cognized before. Here, present perception is qualified by past perception. The thing which we perceive at present is known to be perceived in past, e. g. “This is the same man that I saw'. In Jainism, pratyabhijñā is understood in different sense and it is regarded as a different kind of knowledge and not a form of perception. Nyāya concept of comparison or upamāna can be included under the concept of pratyabhijñā as understood by the Jainas. Extraordinary perception It is of three distinct kinds :1. The perception of classes – sāmānyalaksaņa 2. Acquired perception – jñānalaksaņaPage Navigation
1 ... 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248