Nyaya And Jaina Epistemology

Author(s): Kokila H Shah
Publisher: Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

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NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
syllogism is that "The thesis and reason constitute a syllogism adequate for a knowledgeable person."21 The Jaina theory of two limbed Anumana is opposed to the views given by different philosophers of different schools. Jaina philosophers argue that given the Pakṣa and the reason, a man of intelligence would come to the right conclusion, e. g. The hill is fiery because there is smoke. So strictly speaking only two propositions are necessary. This two-limbed syllogism comes close to enthymeme of the 1st order in western logic. The Jaina view seems to be that other members are redundant because the characteristic feature of an inferential type of knowledge is that because of knowledge of Vyapti, on perceiving the reason, the existence of probandum is inferred. "The essential thing in an argument for the sake of convincing others of a truth is to support and demonstrate the Reason and for establishing it. Reason must be verified even though the example premise' or other premises are used.... Hence the premises of Example. Application and Conclusion are superfluous."
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But the two-limbed argument is meant only for intelligent persons. Where a person is dull, a more elaborate process of the argumentation is necessary. In such a case not only are all the five premises of a Nyāya syllogism necessary; but Jaina logicians go even further than this and conceive of a ten-limbed syllogistic argument. 23 As Bhadrabahu has remarked, "The syllogism is said to consist of five parts or ten parts in the alternative. We denounce neither but accept both as legitimate."24
These ten members are :
1. Pakṣa
the proposition indicating the abode.