Nyaya And Jaina Epistemology

Author(s): Kokila H Shah
Publisher: Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

Page 89

72
NYĀYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
of the objects of knowledge while the second classification refers to the nature of source of knowledge in sabda.
Naiyāyikas recognise sabda as a distinct Pramāņa because according to them such knowledge as is derived from sabda can neither be due to perception nor due to inference. According to Cārvāka, śabda cannot be regarded as a valid means of knowledge because it is only a case of inference and inference cannot be accepted as a valid source of knowledge. Some Indian logicians like the Buddhists hold that śabda cannot be a separate pramāna and it is a form of inference. They say that the ascertainment of the meaning of a verbal statement in no way differs from the inferential process. Of course, this argument is met by an appeal to our introspection which shows that the two processes of inference and interpretation are not identical or it can be reduced to perception if it is used to prove that there are facts corresponding to a sentence. Vaiseșikas include it in inference since, according to them the ground of our knowledge is the same in both.
Samkhya-Yoga, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta systems accept sabda as a separate source of valid knowledge, though the nature of sabda as a source of valid knowledge differs from system to system. In Jainism also śabda is recognised as a distinct source of knowledge.
Nyāya contends that sabda cannot be reduced to perception of inference because knowledge derived from valid verbal testimony is the result of knowledge of words and for this reason sabda deserves to be recognised as an independent source of knowledge.