Nyaya And Jaina Epistemology

Author(s): Kokila H Shah
Publisher: Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

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NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
exist in subject of inference, e. g. smoke existing in the hill.
ii. Sapaksa-sattva—It means that middle term should exist not only in the Paksa but also in the Sapaksa like kitchen etc. containing fire.
iii. Vipakşasattva-A valid middle term must not abide in the vipaksa e. g. the tank where smoke is paksa. Vipaksa is that which contains what is opposed to the matter of inference.
iv. Abādhita-visayatva—it means that a valid middle term should not lead to a conclusion which contradicts what is given in direct perception or authoristative scriptures e. g. 'A fiery body is not hot because it is a substance like water' is invalid because it proves things which go against the matters of perception.
v. Asatpratipaksatva—This characteristic means that a valid middle term should not be such that what is proves may be contradicted by a different line of argument.
Jaina philosophers, however, do not agree with this view of Naiyāyikas that a valid middle term must possess these five characteristics. It may be fallacious even though it may have all these characteristics and these characteristics are unnecessary and superfluous in the sense that they are included implicitly in one and the only characteristic that 'it is never cognized otherwise, than in connection with the sādhya or major term.' "If an unconditional relation is found to subsist between the mark and the proven, there remains nothing more to be noticed as an additional characterisitic so far as Vyāpti is concerned 19.” Against Nyāya Jaina philosophers point out that they recognize two kinds of inference viz. kevalānvaya and the kevala-vyatireka, i. e.