Nyaya And Jaina Epistemology

Author(s): Kokila H Shah
Publisher: Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

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NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
middle term and major term.
The Nyāya classification of inference shows that it is based on different principles than those recognized by western logicians.
The Form of Inference in Nyāya
Inferential reasoning generally resembles in form to pure categorical argument. But there is a great deal of controversy among different philosophers as regards the number of constituent parts of an inference.
According to Buddhist theory of inference two members are quite adequate to form an inference. They, therefore, put forward the theory of two-membered inference. While Mīmāṁsākas believe in three-membered inference. The Nyāya view differs from both these views. According to some old Naiyāyikas, the total number of members of an inference is ten. These are :i. Jijñāsā - A desire to know the truth or
probandum. ii. Samśaya - Doubt regarding the probandum, i.
e. doubt about the real nature of a
thing. iii. Śakyaprāpti - Belief in the probability of the
probandum to lead to true
knowledge iv. Prayojana – The object or the purpose of
inference. V. Samśaya- – removal of all doubts regarding vyudāsa
the truth of an inference.