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NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
Mīmāṁsā, 105)”. When Jainas say that an object has infinite attributes, these attributes are not creations of mind but they have ontological character in the sense that they exist in the object. This marks the distinctive realistic approach of Jaina epistemology. Further, it believes in interrelatedness of objects. Therefore, the two methods of analysis and synthesis are the unique instruments in the act of knowledge. Knowledge is not merely a cognitive act but it is also an organizing principle. Needless to say that Jaina epistemology is empirical. It is also relativistic. It is in this connection that we can grasp the significance of the statement that “a man who knows only one object with all its properties, knows all
objects.”
A critical evaluation of Nyāya and Jaina theory would reveal that there is fundamental difference as regards the relation between soul and knowledge in Nyāya and Jainism. Nyāya puts forward quality theory of knowledge. According to Nyāya, consciousness or knowledge is not the essence of soul. Soul is connected with knowledge accidently. Again Nyāya maintains that soul is absolutely immutable. This is inconsistent with its theory of knowledge. The quality theory of knowledge would lead to scepticism. Nyāya should subscribe to some such view as held by Jainas that consciousness is not merely attribute of soul but is nature of soul. If soul is essentially unconscious, it cannot know the objects and again if soul is absolutely immutable then cognition or knowledge cannot be possible. Pluralistic realism of Nyāya is untenable on Nyāya view of soul. An essentially unconscious soul cannot possibly become a knower.
In spite of these defects, Nyāya has made a great
