Nyaya And Jaina Epistemology

Author(s): Kokila H Shah
Publisher: Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

Page 43

26
NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
of the soul. However, knowledge of mundane soul is restricted because of veil of Karma. Perfect knowledge is possible when the veil of Karma is totally removed. Thus, in Jainism subsidence-cum-destruction of the veli of Karma is a necessary condition of knowledge. Indian-Jaina realists admit the reality of both soul and non-soul. Jaina epistemology starts with the distinction between knowledge and its object. It is realism according to which external objects possess reality independent of the perceiving subject. The function of knowledge is merely to reveal, on the one hand, the objective reality which is already existing and also to reveal itself, on the other hand. Jainism, thus, favours the self-illuminating nature of knowledge. Knowledge, like a lamp, reveals other objects as well as itself, the object so revealed being real. The external objects are independent and they are revealed by knowledge. Soul is both subject and the object of knowledge. Pramāņas are the right means of knowledge. All the forms of knowledge reveal the objects. Pramāņa is defined as right knowledge which is free from obstruction and which illumines itself and other objects. The peculiar Jaina theory is that knowledge reveals its object because the obstacles to knowledge are removed.
Jainas, thus, make the distinction between Pramāņa and its fruits. What is effected by Pramāņas is its fruit and this solves the epistemological problem as to how a thing which is mere being becomes known.
Right knowledge, according to Jainism, is pramāṇa. The validity of knowledge is either determined intrinsically or extrinsically. In some cases, it is intrinsic while in others it is extrinsic. Fallacious knowledge is misunderstanding the nature of a thing. It is that which falsely appears. Jainas thus,