Nyaya And Jaina Epistemology

Author(s): Kokila H Shah
Publisher: Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

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NYĀYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY....
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Like other systems of Indian philosophy Jainas have critically examined the valid sources of knowledge. But Naya (the point of view) is a distinctive feature of Jaina epistemology. Jaina philosophers maintain that knowledge is of two types, viz (i) Pramāņa—which refers to the knowledge of a thing as it is; (ii) Naya—knowledge of a thing in a particular context, or from particular standpoint.
Knowledge is acquired by means of pramāņas which are the instruments of knowledge and Naya which refers to a particular point of view.
Knowledge through Pramāņa
Pramāna is defined as valid knowledge about the self and the not-self4. Jaina definition of pramāņa impiles that valid knowledge of both self and not-self is possible.
Valid knowledge is to be distinguished from doubt, illusion and inattention. The recognition of the not self distinguishes Jaina position from absolute idealism while that of the self distinguishes it from some of the realistic systems like Nyāya, Sankhya and Yoga. Further, Jaina definition of valid knowledge includes both direct and indirect forms of knowledge and, therefore, it is neither too narrow nor too wide because it includes all forms of knowledge and clearly excludes all invalid forms of knowledge. It is clear that Pramāņa determines the nature of a thing as it really is and is opposed to false cognition like doubt, illusion and inattention.
Knowledge through Pramāna is divided into two categories. Tattvārtha sūtra first of all divides knowledge into five categories and then these categories have been included