Nyaya And Jaina Epistemology

Author(s): Kokila H Shah
Publisher: Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

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NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
The Nyāya epistemology is developed as an answer to the challenges posed by Buddhist idealists. Scepticism concerning knowledge is untenable. Russell in the book “Problems of Philosophy also brings out this point. The study of epistemology cannot start without the recognition of fact that there is very existence and possibility of knowledge. We have to assume that there is knowledge and this fact was recognised by the philosophers of almost all the schools of Indian philosophy except Idealistic Buddhists who believe that the world of experience including knowledge and the means of knowledge has only an illusory existence. The Nyāya, in keeping with its basic realistic tenet maintains that authentic knowledge depends upon what there exists in the world of reality, thus, strictly adhering to expiricist position.
In Nyāya sūtras, we find systematic and critical exposition of means of knowledge.
Epistemology in the Nyāya Sūtras
The first account of the means of knowledge which forms the nearest approach to the later systematic exposition of the same in Nyāya sūtras, is to be found in Caraka saṁhitā”. The philosophical position of Caraka samhitā as a whole is in accordance with that of Nyāya school. There are four means of knowledge described in Nyāya sūtras : 1. Pratyakșa — direct knowledge i. e. sense-perception. 2. Anumāna – inference. 3. Upamāna – knowledge by similarity. 4. Śabda - verbal testimony.
The existence of the means of knowledge is established from the fact that there is actually knowledge of the cognised object. The existence of the means of