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CHAPTER ONE
51
grasp only those among them that are of the form of manas; and these latter too are grasped by manahparyāya only insofar as they happen to lie within the limits of the area called Mānuşottara (i.e. the area surrounded by the mountain mānuşottara.) That is why the sphere of objects pertaining to manahparyāya-jñāna is said to be equivalent to that pertaining to avadhi-jñāna divided by ananta. Again, even manaḥparyāya-jñāna, howsoever pure it might be, cannot cognize all the modes belonging to the substances it can possibly grasp. Lastly manaḥparyāya-jñāna directly perceives only a tangible manas engaged in the process of thinking but with the help of a subsequent inference it is possible to cognize all the objects—tangible or otherwise—which this manas thinks of.
The four types of cognition mati etc., howsoever pure they might be, are incapable of grasping all the states of even a single object and that is because they are of the form of but incomplete development of the power of consciousness. On the other hand, it is a rule that the type of cognition which grasps all the states of even a single object can grasp all the states of all the objects; it is this type of cognition that is complete cognition, and it is this that is technically called kevala-jñāna. This type of cognition makes its appearance at the time when there takes place a complete development of the power of consciousness. That is why this type of cognition is not divided into sub-types, a division born of incompleteness. There is no object or a state of it which is incapable of being grasped by the type of cognition in question. That is why it is maintained that kevala-jñāna operates in relation to all the substances along with all of their modes. 27-30.
An Account of the Types of Cognition that can be Simultaneously Present in a Soul :
In a soul there can possibly be present from one to four types of cognition alternatively—that is, without any of the four alternatives being necessarily present there. 31.
In some soul there can possibly be present only one type of cognition, in some other two types, in some other three, in some even four; but all the five types of cognition cannot possibly
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