Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 22

OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.
747
in a human being, it cannot be regarded as right; because such a thing cannot be rightly known by human beings by themselves" (1499)
In the following Text, the author proceeds to show that the definition of Verbal Cognition propounded in Text 1489, as 'that Cognition which is derived from the eternal sentence',- is open to the charge of being "im. possible':
TEXT (1500). AS REGARDS THE ETERNAL SENTENCE', ITS POSSIBILITY AND EXPRESSIVENESS (USEFULNESS) ARE BOTH IMPROBABLE ; HENCE THE FIRST DEFINITION OF VERBAL COGNITION IS AN
IMPOSSIBLE ONE.-(1500)
COMMENTARY.
There is no possibility of there being an eternal sentence', because it has been established that all things are in perpetual flux ; also because of the reasons that are going to be adduced.
Even if such 'eternal Sentence were possible, it could not convey a mean. ing (and serve any useful purpose).
Hence the statement that "Through the eternal Sentence imperceptible things become known"-is impossible; hence the proposed definition is an “impossible 'one-(1500)
Question :-"Why can there be no eternal Sentence ? " Answer
TEXT (1501). THE SENTENCE MAY BE CAPABLE' OR 'INCAPABLE'; IN EITHER CASE, AS THE CHARACTER WOULD BE ALWAYS THER, THE COGNITION RESULTING THEREFROM WOULD COME ABOUT (ALWAYS);
OR IT WOULD NOT COME ABOUT AT ALL.-(1501)
COMMENTARY.
The "eternal Sentence may be capable of bringing about the cognition,-or 'incapable' at times; these two alternatives are possible. In the former case, as the said 'capability' would be always there, the Cognition resulting from it would be always there. This argument may be formulated as follows:-When a thing has its capacity to produce something unobstructed, it must always produce that thing, -as for example, the final causal conditions, the eternal Sentence has its capacity to produce verbal cognition unobstructed at all times, --hence this is a Reason based upon the very nature of the thing. Or it may be formulated as follows:That effect whose cause is present in its perfect condition must come about-e.g. the sprout, whose cause (in the shape of the seed, the soil and the requisite