Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 21

746
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XIX.
TEXT (1498). "THUS THE VERBAL COGNITION IS not-Inference—BECAUSE IT IS DEVOID OF THE THREE Features ;-LIKE SENSE-PERCEPTION - AS IS SHOWN BY THE ABSENCE of an object like that."
-(1498)
COMMENTARY
"The Proposition of his Reasoning is--'The Verbal Cognition is not Inference ; '-' because it is devoid of the three features is the statement of the Probans (Minor Premiss) — like Sense-perception' is the Corroborative Instance. And 'as is shown by the absence of an object like that' is said in support of the Minor Premiss; what is meant by this is that the object of the Inierence brought about by the Inierential Indicative like Smoke is the Subject as endowed with the particular property (Probandum),and any such object is absent in the case of Verbal Cognition."-(1498)
Says the Opponent-'Not having the Three-features, Verbal Cognition may not be Inference; but how can it be regarded as Valid or Right Cognition'?
The answer is as follows:
TEXT (1499).
"INASMUCH AS THE WORDS SPEAKING OF THE Agnihotra AND OTHER
THINGS BRING ABOUT UNSHAKEABLE COGNITIONS, THE CHARACTER OF BEING Right Cognition CANNOT BE
DENIED TO THEM."-(1499)
COMMENTARY.
The cognition is 'unshakeable' by reason of its being free from doubt and error; that is, it is Righe Cognition because there is no Right Cognition sublating it, just in the same way as Sense-perception is Right Cognition.
Says Shabara-svimin (in his Bhāşya on So. 1. 1. 8 " The cognition derived from the statement Desiring Heaven one should offer the Agnihotra' is not a doubtful one,- it leaves us in no doubt as to whether Heaven is to be attained or not; and when this is cognised with certainty, it cannot be wrong; it is only when the cognition, after having come about, becomes sublated by the subsequent idea that it is not so ', that it can be called wrong cognition the cognition in question however is never, at any time or at any place, found to be otherwise ; hence it must be true. As regards the assertion of the common people,-if it comes from a trusted person, or if it pertains to what is actually perceived by the Senses, then it is certainly true ; if, on the other hand, it emanates from an untrustworthy person, or it relates to something beyond the reach of the Senses-then having its source