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Shri Mahavir Jain Aradhana Kendra
www.kobatirth.org
Acharya Shri Kailassagarsuri Gyanmandir
VAIŠESIKA CATEGORIES AND THEISM
45
as somehow identical and different both. The postulation of the relation of samavāva between the two would not solve the problem. It would rather add another category equally unamenable to perception. Moreover, the relation of samavāya is accepted as eternal, ubiquitous and unitary, whereas the terms related by it are transitory and limited in extension, and different in different contexts. Again, the samavāya itself would require another samavāya to relate itself with the terins, and this would lead to infinite regress leaving the terins unrelated. Nor would the quality of conjunction ( sam yoga ) serve the purpose. Conjunction, being admitted as quality by the Vaiseşika, can reside exclusively in a substance, and not in samavāya which is not a substance. The substantive-adjective relation is also not helpful. Such relation is possible only when the terins are already related by another relation. For instance, the stick can function as an adjective if the relation of conjunction between the person and the stick held by him is known beforehand. The Vaiseșika might contend that the samavāya relates itself to the term by itself independently of any other relation. Samavāya is itself a relation and therefore does not need another relation for its relation with the term. But the contention is not tenable. Even as the conjunction (samyoga) and such other qualities require a relation for their residence in the substance, so the samavāya must also be admitted to be in need of another relation for its residence in the terins. It cannot be accepted as self-related. The Vaišesika might argue: «Self-relatedness is the intrinsic nature of samavāya, even as hotness is of fire. There is no justification for comparing the nature of conjunction ( samyoga ) with that of sama vāya Fire is hot and water is cold. It is a question of fact. One should not ask : Why fire is not cold and water is not hot ?" But the Jaina philosopher does not find any substance in the argument. Had the self-relatedness of samavāya been established by perception, the Vai esika could appeal to the nature of things. But it is a question of logic which can be decided only by appeal to reason. The case of conjunction was cited only for the sake of argument against the postulation of samavāya as an independent category and not as a proof against such postulation. In fact, Prasastapāda proves sama vāya by inference, 1
Vidyānanda has adduced a number of cogent arguments against samavāya and the reader will find many interesting points in it. With the refutation of Samavāya the quality of sam yoga ( conjunction ) is also refuted. The postulation of absolute difference is the besetting sin. Some sort of identity between the terms
1 Vide SSP, p. 36, $ 14.
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