Indian Logic Part 01

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 26

CHAPTER 1 ..
.
| PRAMĀNA ARTHĀPATTI AND ABHĀVA
In this Chapter Jayanta ofiers comment on the single Nyāyasūtra aphorism which is to the effect that perception, inference. analogy, verbal testimony are (four) pramaņas. And he accomplishes his task by way of doing the following four things :
(1) formulating his own definition of pramāna and criticising the rival definitions advanced by the Buddhists, Mimām sakas and Sankhyas,
(2) criticizing the Buddhist position that there are only two pramaņas, viz. perception and inference,
(3) criticizing the Mimāṁsā position that arthāpatti is an additional pramāņa,
(4) criticizing the Kumarilite Mimāṁsa position that abhāva is an additional pramāņa.
The four points deserve separate consideration inasmuch as each has to do with a distinct aspect of the general problem of pramāņa. We take them up one by one.
; (1) On Defining Pramāņa The early Nyāya authors were keenly interested in determining as to how many types of cognition there are. They came to the conclusion that these types are four in all, viz. perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy; (the first three are naturally understandable, the fourth is somewhat technical.) It was understood that cognition might be valid or invalid, but the importance of the former was emphasized by talking of valid cognition rather than cognition in general (the word for valid cognition being pramāna, that for cognition in general iñāna)... Again, it was understood that one type of valid cognition differs from another because the two have got different causes, but the concept 'cause 'of valid cognition' was not made a distinct topic . of discussion. But it was this concept that became central in the