Book Title: Indian Logic Part 01
Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

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Page 81
________________ INDIAN LOGIC (iv) On Abhāva Jayanta's consideration of the pramāna called abhāva (meaning absence, also called anupalabdhi meaning non-cognition) which the Kumarilite alone posits is important because in this connection certain such issues have been raised as were a topic of animated controversy among our philosophers. Thus the Kumärilite and the Naiyāyika were of the view that 'absences' constitute a group of independent reals existing by the side of positive reals, but they differed among themselves as to how the direct cognition of an 'absence' takes place. That an 'absence can be indirectly cognized through inference was conceded by both, but while the Naiyāyaka held that an 'absence', just like a positive real, is directly cognized through perception the. Mimāṁsaka held that an 'absence', unlike a positive real, is directly cognized never through perception and always through an independent pramāna called abhāva. This difference of opinion is at the centre of Jayanta's attention in the present part of his text, but he also incidentally considers at due lengh the corresponding posit. ions maintained by the Buddhist and the Prabhākarite. Thus both the Buddist and the Prabhākarite denied that 'absences' constitute a group of indepencent reals and the former developed an elaborate theory as to how an 'absence as understood by him is cognized directly and how it is cognized indirectly. All this Jayanta subjects to criticism after having disposed of the Kumārilite thesis on the pramāna called 'abhāva'. [The criticism of Kumārilite and the Buddhist is preceded by a lengthy presentation of their respective cases, the criticism of the Prabhākarite case is pretty brief.] The Kumārilite submits that when no pramāna is found to operate with a view to cognizing x we have a case of cognizing 'absence of x' through the pramāņa called "abhāva (i. e, absence of all pramāna)'.' Then realizing that a pramāna must be a state of the concerned cognizing soul (preferahly, a positive such state) it is given out that abhāva as thus understood is of the form of 'non-production of a corresponding transformation in the concerned cognizing soul' or 'cognition pertaining

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