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112
INDIAN LOGIC
But Akalanka would not deny the absolute validity of the highest transcendental perception called Keyala-jñāna which requires no media of sense-organs and mind to grasp its object. This suggests that the theory of non-absolutism is not to be applied without discrimination. For if it were so applied even the perfect knowledge of an onniscient being would have to be regarded as partly valid and partly invalid. But here the operation of nonabsolutism ceases, Hence, it is said that even Anekanta itself is anekānta, that is, in certain spheres it operates and in certain others it does not.37
Nature of the source of valid knowledge : We have discussed the definitions of valid cognition. But what is the instrument or source of valid cognition ? It is said by Våtsyāyana that the cause of valid cognition (upalabdhi-hetu) is its instrument. But can any cause of such a cognitior be its instrument ? Not any cause but the one which is the most efficient (karana) is its instrument. But how can we know that a particular cause out of many is the most efficient ? Some Naiyayikas, consider senseorgans to be the instrument of valid perceptual cognition. From this it becomes clear that for them the thing possessed of a function (vyāpāravat) is the most efficient cause. Function here means the action which is immediately and 'invariably followed by the effect concerned. Some other Naiyayikas consider the sense-object contact (sannikarşa) to be the instrument of valid perceptual cognition. So, for them the function itself is the efficient cause. For Jayanta Bhatta neither the thing possessed of a function nor this function itself is the efficient cause. He emphatically holds that it is the aggregate (samagri) of all conditions- physical as well as psychological-that is the most efficieat cause of a valid cognition.". The aggregate is devoid of a function.30 It is the most efficient in comparison to the particular factors (viz. subject, object sense-organ etc.) included in it.3 1 It is noteworthy that Kumärila, in his Ślokavārtika, has for the first time hinted at this view while enumerating all the possible views as regards the instrument of knowledge. 33
As for the question of identity or difference between the resultant cognition and its instrument, the Nyāya--Vaigesikas consider the two to be absolutely different. This view of theirs
