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aess of its object. 43 - The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that tho. agh every cognition is perceptible it is perceived by a cognition other than itself which is called 'after-cognition' (anuvyayasaya)." Dharmakirti and Akalanka both criticise this peculiar Nyaya view.43 They observe that if cognition is not self-revelatory but requires another cognition to reveal itself, it would involve us in an infinite regress. Akalanka has refuted the Bhātta view also...
Thus all philosophers except the Bbāta and the Nyāya-Vaiseşikas “are unanimous in holding that cognition as such is self-perceptible (syaprakasa), that is, that all cognition, whether acquired through perception (pratyakşa), inference (anumāna), verbal testimony (sabda) or memory (smrti), notices its own nature by way of direct observation ((sākṣatkara) while it is called 'inferential," 'verbal,' 'mnemic' etc. owing to the nature of the object grasped (grālıya). In other words, even though differing as regards their respective generating conditions (sāmagri) and pertaining to objects that are differently characterised ‘as capable of being perceived'. ‘capable of being inferred', 'capable of being recalled' etc., the various types of cognition, like perception, inference, memory etc. are, all of them, perceptually cognisant of their own nature (i. e. of themselves)."47
How do we know the validity of knowledge ?: For the Bhagas the validity of cognition is self-evident. . Its invalidity is known only when it is contradicted by some other strong cognition.c. The Naiyāyikas maintain that neither the validity nor invalidity of cognition is self-evident. The two are inferred from its capacity or non-capacity to produce successful activity.50 The extant Sankhya texts give no indication as to what stand it takes on the question under consideration; but the statements of its critics suggest that according to the Sankhyas both the validity and invalidity of cognition are self-evident.51 Dharmakirti holds that cognition is alone selfcognised. Its validity is known through the subsequent successful activity.59 Manoratha commenting on this observes that the validity of cognition is self-evident in the case of repeated acquaintance (abhjāsa) but that in the case of first acquaintance (anabhyasa) it is known through the subsequent successful activity (arthakrivdjñānena).53 In the Pramāṇavartika or in the Manoratha nothing is said regarding the question as to how one knows the
