Indian Logic Part 01

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 91

INDIAN LOGIC
not mean an absence of this thing; (in Jayanta's presentation th: distinction is made betwven things inherently imperceptible and things otherwise, but even a thing not inherently imperceptible might at times be in no position to be cognized even when present).37 In this connection an exception is made in the case of absence of identity'; thus the fact that x is different of y is not. iced as soon as x is noticed irrespective of whether y is something inherently imperceptible or otherwise.88
• Then begins Jayanta's refutation of the above Buddhist case. Thus he submits that the cognition 'x is present' is absolutely on a par with the cognition 'x is absent', so that the Buddhist should either treat both as genuine or dismiss both as illusory but he should not treat the former as genuine and dismiss the latter as illusory 39 What Jayanta here has in mind is the Buddhist position that all deterimnation of the nature of a thing on the part of . thought is something illusory, and his point is that on this logic a positive determination should be as much illusory as a negative determination. But the Buddhist is also of the view that there exist only positive things and no 'absences. So, directing his criticism against this view Jayanta argues that when a jar is present on the floor we say “jar exists on the floor', when a jar is absent on the floor we say “ 'absence of jar' exists on the floor’”; the Buddhist's plea that in the latter case we observe floor-devoid-of-jar is rejected on the ground that being devoid of jar' can mean nothing but being possessed of "absence of jar" ? 1 The Buddhist's point is that when we cognize x and not y we say 'x is present and y is absent' or 'x is characterised by absence of jo?? but that there do not then exist two things, viz. x and 'absence of y'; thus on his showing 'absence of y' is just an aspect of the nature of x as determined by the appropriate thought-activity. With this sort of argumentation Jayanta's difficulty is that he readily grants that more than one thing might exist at one place at one time; e. g. where a jar exists there also exist its colour, its touch its action, its 'universal, and so on and so forth, so that here there might also exist 'absence of cloth' 'absence of cow and so on and so forth. These so many things co-existing with the jar are for Jayanta so many independent reals, for the Buddhist they are so