Indian Logic Part 01

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 90

PRAMĀNA ARTHĀPATTI AND ABHAVA
81
ens when one concept is defined in terms of another. And the cases of svabhāva-anumāna are cases of inference where the probans and the probandum are two such concepts that the former implies the latter or the two imply each other. This means that the cases of one concept being defined in terms of another are cases of svabhava-anumāna where the probans and the probandum are two such concepts that they imply each other (for two eqivalent concepts do imply each other). Hence it is that according to the Buddhist the case of a non-cognition making possible dealing-concerning-absence is a case of svabhāva-anumāna where this non--cognition is the probans and this dealing the probandum; (here by speaking of 'dealing-concerning-absence' instead of 'cognition-cocerning-absence' it is emphasized that the present is a case of just defining the concept 'absence' and not of asserting that an 'absence' is an independent real). Lastly, by emphasizing that a non-cognition here spoken of is not a mere absence of cognition but a positive cognition it is made out that an 'absence' is noticed never except in a noticed locus. As put thus all this sounds quite plausible, but the Buddhist's technical terminology - partly misleading - considerably obscures all this. Thus it is difficult to see what he means by saying that in a case of syabhava-anumāna the probaps and the probandum are one with eachi other and how in the present case this identity is not retained when the probandum is 'dealing-concerning-absence' but retained when it is ‘ability for dealing-concerning-absence'. So we must remember that the fact that a svabhava-anumāna is a case of one concept implying another is expressed by the Buddbist by saying that in a svabhāva-anumāna the probans and the probandum are one with each other. Again, it is realized that even when two concepts are actually equivalent they are so treated only by one to whom the equivalence concerned is evident; hence it is contended that a case of non-cognition is not actu only potentially a case of dealing-concerning absence.
Lastly, the Buddhist raises a point which is in fact a common point of all logicians. Thus, it is stressed that the non-cognition of a thing for whose cognition conditions are not available will