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APPENDIX ON THE PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE
IN GENERAL
DO
The question as to how we can know reality is of the utmost importance. Are there any means with whose help we can know reality ? If there are, how many are they and on what ground can we consider them to be valid ? In what way can we know knowledge itself and especially its validity (prāmān ya) ? These are some of the problems regarding knowledge. We present in brief the various views adopted by the different systems of Indian philosophy on the problems of knowledge in general.
Definition of valid knowledge (pramāņa = pramā) : Kanāda considers only that cognition to be valid whose cause is free from defects.' Vätsyāyana's word for cognition is upalabdhi and - he defines pramana as the means of upalubdhi ? But he is not unmindful of the fact that not every cognition but only that which presents an object, as it is, is valid (arthavat pramānam). Vācaspati explains the word 'arthavat' as 'non-contradictory to the nature of the object concerned' (arthāvyabhicari). Vācaspati clearly explains what he means by the non-contradictory character of valid knowlenge. 8 He puts this characteristic in the very definition of valid knowledge. The later Naiyāyikas follow him and observe that the cognition that presents an object with a character which it really has is valid Nor would the Naiyayikas hesitate to regard the coherence between the cognitive and conative activities as one of the characteristics of valid knowledge. 5 Thus with the Naiyāyikas the presentativeness, the non-contradictoriness (i, e, the correspondence between a cognition and its object) and the coherence between the cognitive and the conative activities are the essential defining characteristics of valid cognition The Prābhākaras define valid knowledge as immediate experience (anubhūti).. The Bhättas, under the influence of the Buddhists, hold that valid cognition invariably pertains to a novel object. 7 They follow Kanāda when they maintain that valid cognition is that cognition which originates from a non-defective cause. It was perhaps Dinnāga who for the first time pointed out that valid
