Indian Logic Part 01

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 84

PRA MĀNA ARTHĀPATTI AND ABHĀVA
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through perception but nor is it had through memory or inference both necessarily requiring a prior perception which here obviously did not take place.8 As a matter of fact, here the place concerned and x are such that if cognized together they must be recalled together, so that the fact that the place is recalled but not x implies that x was not cognized along with the place; (really, the possibility is not ruled out that x was present there but was not noticed, but let us ignore that possibility.) Thus this case is essentially of the same type as the case when a floor is perceived and 'absence of jar' on this floor is cognized through implication, a cognition which according to the Kumārilite is had neither through perception nor through inference but through a new pramāṇa called abhāva.
Jayanta begins his refutation of the Kumarilite case by arguing that the perceptual cognition the jar is absent on the floor' is of the same type as the perceptual cognition 'curd is present in the bowl', so that just as both curd and bowl are an object of perception both 'absence of jar' and floor are an object of perception. His point is that here an employment of eyes at once reveals both floor and 'absence of jar', this unlike the case of inferring fire from smoke where smoke is revealed to eyes but not fire. V To this is added that the present case is also unlike the case where the colour of a distant fire is perceptually cognized through eyes but not its touch, the point being that it is impossible for eyes to cognize touch but not to cognize an 'absence'.11 Really, Jayanta is simply taking for granted that an "absence' is an independent real and that it is an object of perception; in point of fact, the first proposition which is basic is of extremely doubtful validity. However, he does consider the objection that an 'absence' which is devoid of colour should not be an object of visual perception; his answer is that an atom even while possessed of colour is not an object of perception. 1 2 Similarly, the objection that an 'absence' which does not come in contact with an eye should not be an object of perception is answered by saying that sky even while coming in contact with an eye is not an object of perception. 1 3 Both these answers are