Indian Logic Part 01

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 87

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INDIAN LOGIC
The Buddhist is somehow referring to his famous position that the properties of a thing are nothing over and above this thing so that even if an 'absence' is a qualifying property of the thing acting as its locus it can be nothing over and above this thing; (however, this important point is here developed just in passing and not in a clear-cut fashion). Then is considered the question whether a relation can possibly obtain between an absence and its counterpositive. The suggestion that an ordinary positive relation obtains between the two is rejected on the obvious ground that the two do not exist simultaneously, but on the same ground is rejected the suggestion that there obtains between the two the relation called 'opposition', that is, the type of relation that obtains between a jar and the stick that breaks up this jar. 22 Thus it is argued that 'absence of a jar', since it is something incapable of performing a function, cannot break up a jar.? 3 The Budd hist's point here is that an 'absence', since it is not an independent real, cannot act as a cause, but he soon goes on to argue his famous position that even a positive thing supposed to be a cause of destruction is never actually such a cause inasmuch as all thing automatically undergoes destruction as soon as it is born.24 However, even this position is in a way relevant for the present discussion, for destruction is supposed to be an important type of absence' (so-called 'posterior absence') and the Buddhist is here telling us as to how destruction is nothing over and above the concerned positive things. Thus on his showing the stick falling on a jar does not bring about an 'absence' called 'destruction of jar' but the positive entities called 'potsherds', his point * being that if destruction of jar' is something apart from this jar then this jar should be visible there even after 'destruction of jar' has been brought about.95 The opponent pleads that the potsherds are themselves what constitutes 'absence of jar'; the Buddhist retorts that in that case the destruction of these potsherds, being a destruction of 'absence of jar', must mean re-emer. gence of the jar.6 The opponent's plea is based on the consideration that 'absence of jar' occurs precisely at the place where the potsherds occur, the Buddhist's retort is based on the sonsideration that 'absence of jar' is nothing apart from the