Indian Logic Part 01

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 32

PRAMĀNA ARTHĀPATTI AND ABHAVA
to say that they are a part and parcel of the instrument that prodduces cognition. As a matter of fact, Jayanta's thesis on causal aggregate is strongly reminiscent of the Buddhist way of Igoking at things while his thesis on instrument is the usual Nyāya way of looking at things, and the two ways are in a way incompatible with one another. Thus while explaining any case of causatiott - voluntary or otherwise - the Buddhist would speak of a causal aggregate producing an effect and he would make no fundamental distinction within the body of this aggregate. On the other hand, the Nyāya author would exclusively speak of voluntary causation (as a result of espousing theism he even believes that all causation is voluntary causation) and in this connection he would speak of an agent applying an instrument on an object. Thos even if the Nyāya author could see the point of speaking about a causal aggregate producing an effect he would include within this aggregate the agent, the object as well as the instrument; but for this very reason he would refuse to concede that this causal aggregate is to be called instrument. That Jayanta was somehow aware of this difficulty will become evident soon, but before coming to that point let us consider his reply to the third objection urged against his position.
(3) The third objection is one to the effect that in common Irlance we never say that one cognizes an object through the concerned causal aggregate. Jayanta rcplies that that is so because this aggregute being but of tire form of a totality of its constituent members it is not spoken of in common parlance. 13 This reply is patently dogmatic and as a matter of fact Jayanta should have reported : "No. we say that one cognizes through the concerned causal aggregate.” Even so, Jayanta does make an important point: for he in essence submits that about each and every member of the concerned causal aggregate we can say that one cognizes an object through it. [He was not categorical about
at because of his old difficulty that the statement in question cannot be made about the agent concerned and the object concerned.I' Jayanta's argumentation clearly implies that in his view his Nvaya colleagues have been misled by the grammarian's