Indian Logic Part 01

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 47

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INDIAN LOGIC
him that since he does not share the Buddhist view that a cogni-- tion hears the form of its object (for that view ultimately leads to idealism) no purpose of his is served by maintaining that all cognition is self-cognitive. 50 This last lap of Jayanta's argumentation provokes some re-capitulation. Thus the Buddhist, the Kumārilite, the Prabbākarite as well as Jayanta are basing themselves on the consideration that after an object has been cognized the cognizer concerned cannot fail to realize that the cognition concerned has taken place. Nay, they are also virtually agreed as to defining the causal aggregate that goes to produce cognition. But the true position that to cognize a cognition means to rationally understand how the concerned causal ' aggregate produces this cognition finds clearest recognition in the Kumârilite way of looking at things.
Then Jayanta considers an altogether different aspect of the Kumārilite definition of pramáņa. Thus according to this definition the object of pramāņa must be something that was hitherto uncognized, a stipulation which Jayanta finds untenable. 1 Unfortunately, here again the Kumārilite is and. Jayanta is not on the right track. For it is the very nature of cognition that it must take note of some new feature in an object so that what takes note of some old feature in an object is called not cognition but recognition. Somewhat aware of all this Jayanta begins by consi-- dering the question as to what is the use of cognizing something that has already been cognized; his first answer is tbat a cognition should not cease to be cognition simply because it is useless, his second answer is that the repeated cognition of an object enables one to handle this object more effectively. 59 The second answer has an implication that goes against Jayanta's own position for the repeated cognition of an object enables one to handle this object more effectively precisely because on each occasion some new feature of this object comes to light, an objection noted by Jayanta.53 But difficulty arose because of an odd case considered by our logicians. Thus they considered it possible that one might go on cognizing one and the same object (meaning one and the same cbjective feature) for a long time, and Jayanta asks the