Indian Logic Part 01

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 54

PRAMANA ARTHAPATTI AND ABHAVA
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thought have got two destinct types of object to deal with. Let us see how.
The Buddhist begins by arguing that there are just two types of pramāņa because there are just two types of object-to-becognized, his point being that corresponding to a type of pramāņa there must be a type of object-to-be-cognized. That the objectsto-be-cognized are of just two types is sought to be prove through a dichotomy alleged to be established on the basis of perception itself; thus it is contended that an object-to-becognized must be either something sense-cognized or something not-sense-cognized, either something of the form of a unique particular or of the form of a class-character, it being further claimed that both these dichotomies are revealed in perception (just like the dichotomy that an object must be either blue or not-blue). The idea is that when a colour-patch is perceived as blue it is also realized that it is not something not-blue and that there can be nothing that is neither blue nor not-blue; similarly, when a thing is perceived as something sense-cognized (or something, of the form of a unique particular) it is also realized that it is not something not-sense-cognized (or something of the form of a class-cbaracter) and that there can be pothing that is neither some-- thjpg sebst-cognized nor something not-sense-cognized (or neither something of the form of a unique particular nor something of the form of a class-character).: The difficulty with this sort of argument is that on the Buddhist's own showing an object is identified as belonging to a class. not through perception but through thought so much so that even to identify a colour-patch as blue is an act of thought rather than perception. Hence it is added that the identification in question is made not by perception itself but by thougbt arising in the wake of perception. However. even then the understanding remains that this identification is made by perception (for that is the whole point of the present argumentation); so it is next added that when perception has shown that the objects-to-be-cognized are of just two types, inference too lends support to the same basing itself on the consideration that what is x cannot be not-x and that nothing can be neither x nor