Indian Logic Part 01

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 57

INDIAN LOGIC
(1) The alternative that perception reveals that a senseorgan has been employed with a view to cognizing an object is. rejected on the ground that such a revelation is the task not of the perception itself but of a subsequent inference.
(2) The alternative that perception reveals ihat an object has been cognized through the perceptual type of cognition is rejected on the ground that a cognition while cognizing its object. does not cognize itself as well.14.
The consideration of the second alternative leads to an independent examination of the famous Buddhist position that all cognition of an object presupposes self-cognition on the part. of this cognition. Jayanta's central point is ihat at the time of cognizing an object one does not have the feeling that one is having two cognitions - a cognition of the object concerned and a cognition of this cognition itself. 15 The alternative that this cognition is cognized by a subsequent cognition is reject the ground that that will lead to an infinite regress; ihe alternative that this cognition cognizes itself (an alternative actually adopted by the Buddhist) is rejected on the ground that nothing that is cognized cognizes itself just as a physical object does not cognize itself.16 Then is considered a point of fundamental importance.17 Thus the Buddhist has argued that all mental state, unless it is cognized and cognized by itself, is as good as not arisen. Jayanta on his part distinguishes between cognition on the one hand and the remaining mental states like pleasure, pain etc, on the other and argues that the essence of the latter lies in that they are enjoyed and in order to be enjoyed they must be perceived; however, according to him even they are not perceived by themselves but by a subsequent cognition. On the other hand, on Jayanta's showing the essence of a cognition lies in apprehe nding its object and this essence remains unimpaired even if this cognition remains uncognized; however, unlike the Kumärilite Mimāmsaka, the concedes that a cognition might be perceived by a subsequent cogniton just as pleasure, pain etc. are. (That pleasure, pain etc. are perceived by a subsequent cognition is conceded even by the Kumärilite. We have not yet considered the question