Indian Logic Part 01

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 60

"PRAMĀNA ARTHẬPATTI AND ABHAVA
misleading way of saying that perception and thought are two incommensurate processes inasmuch as the former is a physiological process, the latter a mental process. This should become 'further cvident from 2 perusal of certain things Jayanta says while .concluding the topic.
The Buddhist maintains that a unique particular to be exclusively grasped through perception is something necessarily sensecognized, a class-character to be exclusively grasped through thought is something necessarily non-sense-cognized. As a matter of fact. a class-character is not something over and above the concerned particular objects but merely a behaviour-pattern of these objects. But Jayanta subscribes to an ontology according to which particular substances are one type of reals, “universals' another type, qualities a third typ-, action a fourth type, and so on and so forth. Hence he argues that even if there are two types of objects-to-be-cognized it should be possible for both to be an object of perception as well as inference inasmuch as the thing might be sense-cognized under one condition, not-sensecognized under another condition. Then he recalls that according to the Buddhist the thing that is perceived now and the co. rresponding thing that is made an object of parctice later on are not the same thing but two things belonging to the same 'series, this meaning that despite the Buddhist's insistence to the contrary these two things are an object of perception as well as thought ('series' being an object of thought). 29 Jayanta suspects that the Buddhist draws a sharp contrast between perception and thought with a view to dismissing as something thought-cognized and hence something unreal the Nyāya categories like 'universal etc: he considers this endeavour futile inasmuch as according to him
ategories are well established.. Again, Jayanta finds ungrounded the Buddhist's fear that to cognize the same thing through two types of cognition should be futile or self-contradictory: for according to him it is well possible to cognize something that has already been cognized, it being further pointed out that two tune of cognition cognizes a thing in two different manners.31 Lastly Javanta repudiates the Buddhist's argument that perception and