Indian Logic Part 01

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 74

PRAMĀNA ARTHĀPATTI AND ABHĀVA
his being alive is posited. 3 9 Jayanta ridicules this whole understanding by pointing out that if the resultant knowledge alleged to be something unaccounted for is already had, nothing further remains to be done. 40 The opponent suggests that what is already had is not the resultant knowledge as a particular case but it in its general nature; Jayanta retorts that that means that this knowledge is already had as standing in a relation of invariable concomitance, his point being that in that case arthapatti is nothing different from inference.41 Lastly, Jayanta cogitates as follows : "The knowledge of presence-outside-house remains unaccounted for unless the knowledge of absence-inside-house coupled with being alive is posited -- what does it mean? If it means that the former knowledge necessitates the latter knowledge it will be an ordinary case of inference where the knowledge of probans (of smoke, say) necessitates the knowledge of probandum (of fire, say). If it means that absence-inside-house (coupled with being alive) produces presence-outside-house, that will lead to the absurdity that for one moment our man will be neither inside house nor outside (for it will require a moment for him to be produced). Thus are refuted those too who make out that in inference instrumental knowledge necessitates resultant knowledge, in arthāpatti the object of the former knowledge produces the object of the latter · knowledge." 49 The fact of the matter is that conceptual analysis often yields two equivalent concepts which, for that very reason, can act as probans for one another; and the present case is actually such a case. Then we can say "If x is alive and absent-inside-house, x is present-outside-house" and also “If x is present-outside-house, x is alive and absent-insidehouse." The Prabhākarite labours under the misconception that all cases of arthāpatti are of such a type; and this misleads him into speaking as if in all cases of arthāpatti the resultant knowledge can act as the knowledge of probans does in an inference. As a matter of fact, inference and arthāpatti (=implication) are one and the same logical process, so that what is instrumental knowledge or resultant knowledge in the case of one is also the mame in the case of the other. Linguistic convention demands
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