Indian Logic Part 01

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 56

PRAMANA ARTHAPATTI AND ABHAVA
general and inference in partcular, both possibly arising in the wake of senory experience. Certainly, the Buddhist rightly notes that sensory experience and thought are two fundamentally distinct types of processes, but instead of realizing that the former is a physiological process, the latter a cognitive (= mental) process he views them as two types of cognitive processes, the former having for its object unique particulars supposed to be something real, the latter class-characters supposed to be something unreal. Be that as it may, the Buddhst closes the present presentation of his case by emphasizing that sensory experience and thought are two fundamentally distinct types of processes. First is cited an analogy where the latter is compared to the light emitted by stars and the moon, the former to that emitted by the sun.' Then it is pointed out that one lacking a sense-organ cannot have the corresponding sensory experience related to an object but he can well have verbal knowledge (= thought type of cognition) about this object. 10 Lastly comes the contention that burning experienced through the torch of fire is one thing, burning learnt of through the word 'burning' is an altogether different thing. 11 All this should leave one in no doubt that perception as understood by the Buddhist is the process of bare sensory experience, the implication being that all that deserves to be called 'cognition' comes under what he calls 'thought'. Jayanta, however, attacks the Buddhist position from his own angle; to that we trun next.
Jayanta begins by taking exception to the Buddhist's contention that perception itself decides that there are two types of cognition with their respective types of object-to-be-cognized, He pertinently remarks that such a decision should in no case be possible on the part of perception as conceived by the Buddhist, a perception devoid of all thought; to this is added that the decision in question should be possible neither on the part of thought which on the Buddhist's showing has nothing to do with things real.12 Jayanta further concludes that simple perception might decide whether a thing is blue or not-blue but that it cannot decide whether it is sense-cognized or not-sense-cognized.13 In this connection he rejects two alternatives and as follows :