Indian Logic Part 01

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 45

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INDIAN LOGIO
object being perceived as something cognized, and so he seeks support in another direction. For now he quotes the Mimāṁsā stalwart, Sabara as mentioning cognition and action together, which means that according to the latter cognition is not of the form of action.*8 Now it is not improbable that to view cognition as an operation is a post-Sabara development in the history of Mimāṁsā school; but to view it as something, essentially unobservable seems to be as old as Sabara. So Jayanta lastly directs his attack against this latter position itself. His first argument is that if x is never an object of perception it can also never be an object of inference. 44 But realizing the weakness of such an argument (which should make it impossible for a philo-- sopher to posit anything imperceptible) he next submits that an ‘operation' over and above the respective actions of the members of the concerned causal aggregate is an untenable concept. 5 This is no new submission, as is confessed. So, lastly is examined the argument actually most favourite of the Kumārilite. The argument is that the fact that an object is found to be something cognized remains unaccounted for unless it is posited that the cognition concerned has taken place, this being called cognizing this cognition by way of implication; Jayanta. in essence replies that the fact in question can be accounted for 'even on his supposition about the nature of cognition.4 6 He is correct as we ourselves pointed out when he himself argued that this. fact can be accounted for even on his supposition about the nature of cognition. But the question is which accounting is more tenableJayanta's or the Kumarilite's; and viewed thus it seems a better course that cognition be treated as an operation which results in the object concerned being cognized, a result manifested in the circumstance that the cognizer concerned is in a position to deal with the object concerned more effectivety than before. It is this course which the Kumāriiite in essence recommends and which Jayanta rejects in the name of arguing that the Kumarilite concept of object-cognizedness is untenable. Thus on his showing this concept might mean that the object concerned has been made an object of cognition or that some new property has been pro