Indian Logic Part 01

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

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INDIAN LOGC
stood differently by the Buddhist, the Naiyayika and the Kumarilite Mimārsaka. The Buddhist says that x is cognized not directly but by way of cognizing cognition-of-x and finding that it bears the form of x. The Naiyāyika and the Kumārilite Mimārsaka find this stand untenable, for with them cognition-of-r is itself a cognizing of x and not something which when cognized results in a cognizing of x. It is essentially this criticism that Jayanta presently advances against the Buddhist even if his words seem to relate to a different subject-matter. For he first takes exception to the Buddhist contention that unless a cognition bears the form of its object there will be no way to distinguish cognition : from cognition-of-y (the suggestion that the two cognitions will differ inasmuch as the former is caused by x the latter by r is rejected on the ground that the causal aggregate of a cognition includes not only its object but so many other factors whose form this cognition does not bear). Jayanta remarks that this whole position the Buddhist maintains with a view to lead ng support to idealism and that it will be considered while refuting idealism.27 But towards the end he actually hints at his line of attack. For he argues that the fact that cognition-of-x is caused by x while cognition-of-y is caused by y should suffice co distinguish these two cognitions just as according to the Buddluist this fact suffices to explain why the former cognition bears che form of x, the latter bears the form of y, his point being that the thesis of 'formed' cognition possesses no advantage over the rival thesis of “unformed' cognition.28 And Jayanta's submission that the thesis of 'formed' cognition has been maintained with a view to leading support to idealism is valid inasmuch as that is one serious use that the Buddhists have made of this thesis, cor supporting the idealist standpoint they have actually argued tijat there is no warrant to posit an external object when all that we ever cognize is not this object itself but a cognition bearing the form of this object. However, from the standpoint of logical -studies the more particular criticism against the Buddhist stand is 'that it makes no sense to say that x is cognized not directly but by way of cognizing cogaition-of-x. This criticism too Jayanta levels but again in words that seem to arelte to a different