Aptamimansa Critique of an Authority Bhasya

Author(s): Samantbhadracharya, Akalankadev, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Jagruti Dilip Sheth Dr

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY
conventional to say that there exists a composite body over and above its component-parts.
(iii) On the question of the substance-attribute relationship the Nyāya-Vaiseşikas maintained that substances constitute one group of real entities while their attributes (further subdivided into qualities and actions and residing in substances by samavāya-relation) constitute another such group. As against this, the Buddhists maintained that it is merely conventional to say that the empirical world consists of substances on the one hand and their attributes on the other.
(iv) On the question of the universal features exhibited by empirical phenomena the Nyāya-Vaiśesikas maintained that a universal feature is an independent (and eternal) entity that resides (by samavāya-relation) in the substances, qualities or actions of which it is the universal feature. As against this, the Buddhists maintained that it is merely conventional to say that certain empirical phenomena share a universal feature in common.
Now the Jaina found something unsatisfactory - and also some thing satisfactory - about both the Nyāya-Vaiseșika and the Buddhist positions on the four questions here posed. Hence in each case he sought to offer a new position which was in his eyes free from the defects vitiating the two rival positions that had held the field. The following is how he proceeded :
(i) On the question of permanence and transience he maintained that each and every empirical phenomenon is permanent so far as its substance-aspect is concerned while it is momentary so far as its modeaspect is concerned.
(ii) On the question of the relation between a composite body and its component-parts he maintained that to assume the form of a composite body is nothing but the assuming of a particular mode by the concerned component-parts in their capacity as substances
(iii) On the question of the substance-attribute relationship he maintained that a substance represents the substance-aspect of an empirical phenomenon while its attributes represent either the qualityaspect or the mode-aspect of this phenomenon.29 29. Certain Jaina scholars make no distinction between quatity-aspect and mode-aspect;
on their vicw it can bc said that the attributes of a substance represent the modeaspect of an empirical phenomenon. On the other hand, those Jaina scholars who distinguish between quality-aspect and mode-aspect lend to identify quality-aspect with substance-aspect, but since an express distinction between substance-aspect and quality-aspect is necessary to their position the above formulation may be taken to represent this very position.