Aptamimansa Critique of an Authority Bhasya

Author(s): Samantbhadracharya, Akalankadev, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Jagruti Dilip Sheth Dr

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ONENESS AND SEPARATENESS Buddhist fails to account for (i) the fact of certain empirical phenomena exhibiting a serial order, (ii) the fact of certain empirical phenomena forming a composite whole, (iii) the fact of certain empirical phenomena exhibiting mutual similarity, and (iv) the fact of transmigration. An impartial reader will however find that each of these four facts is recognized by the Buddhist empiricist even if his explanation of it is couched in a terminology different from that resorted to by the Jaina. The following is how the Buddhist empiricist and the Jaina polemicized against each other. The Jaina says that certain empirical phenomena, even while mutually different, are also somehow mutually one - either quâ the modes of the same substance or quâ the component parts of the same composite whole or quâ mutually similar. The Buddhist empiricist thinks that the Jaina is contradicting himself when he says that the empirical phenomena in question are mutually different as also mutually one; he, therefore, comes out with the suggestion that these phenomena, even while mutually different, are called one. The Jaina on his part thinks that by talking thus the Buddhist empiricist is repudiating the veracity of all verbal usage on man's part; he, therefore, argues against the latter's position in the manner of Samantabhadra. In passing let us note that the Jaina's or the Buddhist empiricist's position on the question of transmigration is but a corollary of his position on the general question of 'serial order' or 'substancehood.' In the verse 30 Samantabhadra draws an inconvenient conclusion from the Buddhist empiricist's alleged position on the question of similarity. Samantabhadra presumes that the Buddhist will deny all similarity between any two empirical phenomena; this means - so proceeds on Samantabhadra - that the latter will deny that a piece of knowledge and its object are similar insofar as both are real, and that in its turn will mean that in the latter's eyes knowledge is not a real phenomenon. But then Samantabhadra asks how one who repudiates the reality of all knowledge whatsover can vindicate the reality of anything whatsover - everything whatsover being a possible object of knowledge. It is difficult to see what Samantabhadra is driving at. In the verse 31 we find Samantabhadra spelling out his basic criticism against the Buddhist - viz. that the latter's understanding of the facts under consideration amounts to repudiating the veracity of all verbal usage on man's part. In the subscquent parts of his discussion Samantabhadra will further elaborate his criticism of the NyayaVaiścsika and Buddhist positions on the questions of ontology.