Aptamimansa Critique of an Authority Bhasya

Author(s): Samantbhadracharya, Akalankadev, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Jagruti Dilip Sheth Dr

Page 66

ONENESS AND SEPARATENESS
31
also in verses 9-11 dealing with the doctrine of absolute being'). The crux of the doctrine of absolute nondualism lies in maintaining that some one trans-empirical reality - call it sūnya, vijñāna, brahman or whatever you like - is alone real while the diversity exhibited by the empirical world existing in space-time is but an illusory appearance. Against this doctrine Samantabhadra chiefly urges two difficulties, one (expressed in the verse 24) that on its acceptance the phenomenon of causation becomes an impossibility, the other (expressd in the verse 26) that on its acceptance the phenomenon of inferential cognition becomes an impossibility; in other words, Samantabhadra feels that the doctrine is incompatible with an empirical ontology and all logic whatsover. And certainly there can be no worse condemnation of a philosophical position. However, the criticism urged by Samantabhadra against the doctrine in question in the verse 25 is more rhetorical than material while the one urged in the verse 27 is even fallacious. To take the verse 25, the problem of virtue and sin, that of worldly bondage and liberation, that of this world and the world beyond are but so many cases of the problem of empirical causation, a problem basic to all treatment of empirical ontology; similarly, the problem of knowledge and ignorance is basic to all treatment of logic. To take the verse 27, it is difficult to follow Samantabhadra when he in effect argues : "Nondualism cannot be a reality unless dualism is, because 'dualism' is a word, just as pseudoprobans cannot be a reality unless probans is because 'probans' is a word)"; let us however wait till Samantabhadra develops an analogous argument at a later stage (to be precise, in verses 84-85).
Verses 28-31 इष्टमद्वैतैकान्तापवारणम्, पृथक्त्वैकान्ताङ्गीकरणात्, इति माऽवदीधरत् ।।
पृथक्त्वैकान्तपक्षेऽपि पृथक्त्वादपृथक् तु तौ। पृथक्त्वे न पृथक्त्वं स्यादनेकस्थो ह्यसौ गुणः ॥२८॥
On the other hand, if one maintains that things are possessed of the character absolute separateness', then there arises the following difficulty. Two things (sought to be declared separate) ought to be non-separate from separateness itself (which will be an undesirable contingency for one who is out to repudiate all nonseparateness). Certainly, if separateness is separate from