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DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
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the appearance and disappearance of entirely different properties ;-what then what you advocate is that, in the case of an entity, its own essential character remaining constant, there is variation in its conditions (states), and this is what is meant by Modification'. When, however, the Properties are distinct from the Entity having the properties, there is no possibility of any essential character remaining constant, as the entity itself is the one * essence of the Properties; and that, ex hypothesis is entirely different from them so that there is no possibility of any essential character remaining constant. Nor again does any person aver become cognisant of any such Property coming within his range of cognizanco as is different from the appearing and disappearing Properties; Jience all wise mon regard such a property as non-existent.If, however, it be held that it is not a different entity at all, as both the properties, the appeariny as srell as the disappearing, would be non-different from the Entity to which they belong-tliey should, like the Entity itself, bo one only; and under the circumstances, on what basis vould uitler the Erity or the Property be modified? The two varying Properties being non-different from the Entity whiel remains constant,-there can be no appearance (production) or disappearance (destruction) of these,-just as there is none of the constant Entity. As regards the Entity also, inasmuch as it is non-different from the Properties, all that might be possible would be the production (appearance) of something new that did not exist beiore and the destruction (disappearance) of that which has been in exist. ence : so that in no case wonld there be Modification of any single thing, I-rom all this it follows that even the basis of Modification your theory of Cause and Effect' is not tenable.
All this defect in the Sikhya theory is too manifest to need nssertiou ; -rith this idea, the Author has omitted to set it forth, and with the idea that we shall answer later on the objection that the sandhya las urged against the theory of the Effect being non-existent (before the cansal oper. ation)',-ho proceeds, at this stage, to criticise the theory of the Effect being excistent, by showing that it is open to the same objections (that have been urged against the theory of the Effect being non-existent). This is what is done in the text-In answer to this, etc.'
The term "sulhiyah', wise ones', stands for the Bauddhas; they declare that the fivefold argument that the Sarikhya has set forth in the words
Because what is non-existent cannot be producel, etc.' (Sarikhyakürikā, 9),- is equally applicable ngainst the theory of the Effect being existent. For instance, it can be asserted (with equal reason) that 'Because what is existent cannot be produced, because there is recourse to the Cause, because all things are not possible, because the efficient thing can produce only that for which it is efficient, and--because the Effect is of the same essence as the Cause,-therefore the Effect is not existent';--[the reading
A sadakaranal' of the Sankhyakārikā being altered into 'Va sadakara nåt') the negative "not' (in the beginning) being construed with the phrase the Effect is existent (at the end of the sentence). “Why should the Effect be regarded as not existent ?"-Because of all the very same reasons thnt have been set forth in the Sankhyakuriki-Because what is non-existent cannot be produceri, etc. etc.- and when an objection is equally applicable to
