Indian Logic Part 02

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 14

PERCEPTION INFERENCE ANALOGY
As has been noted in details, Ahnika I is devoted to a commentation on the single Nyāyasūtra aphorism which simply lays down that the four pramānas are' perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony. And in this connection Jayanta has so conducted his discussion that he has been able to include within its scope some of the most burning philosophical problems of his times. Essentially the same is his. procedure in Ahnika II where he comments on the three Nyāyasūtra aphorisms formulating a definition of the three pramāņas perception, inference and analogy. As a result, this Chapter (a study of Ahnika II) gets divided into three natural sections each devoted to one pramāna; and these sections we take up for examination one by one.
SECTION ONE : PERCEPTION The section on perception can be conveniently divided into four subsections as follows: (a) On the Nyāyasūtra definition of perception (b) On the Buddhist definition of perception (c) On the Kumārilite definition of perception (d) On the Sankhya definition of perception. · Below they are considered in this very order.
(a) On the Nyāyasūtra definition of Perception The following is how Nyāyasūtra defines perception :
Perception (pratyakşa) is that cognition (jñāna) which is born of a sense-object contact (indriyārthasannikarşotpanna), is non-verbal (avyapadesya), is non-erroneous (avyabhicārin), is certain (vyavasāyātmaka). By way of elaborating and defending this definition Jayanta successively tells us why it includes the word ‘indriyārthasannikarşotpanna', why the word jñāna, why the word 'avyapadesya', why the word 'avyabhicārin', why the word 'vyavasāyātmaka'; but before all he considers the question as to what the word 'pratyaksa' here stands for. The question arises because the present one is supposed to be a definition of the pramāņa called pratyaksa while by the word 'pramāna' the later Nyāya authors understand something that causes valid cognition'. Jayanta's own