Indian Logic Part 01

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 13

INDIAN LOGIC
of the fourteen padārthas samsaya ( = doubt ) etc. – that is, of the sixteen padārthas minus pramana and prameya -- the philosophy of his school would be reduced to the status of mere adhyātmavidyā (= spiritual science) just like Upanisads ; elsewhere too he attributes to this philosophy the generic designation adhyātmavidya'. From this one can surmise that the ethical problem of worldly bondage and release along with the allied ontological problems was considered to be the specific subject matter of the: discipline called adhyatmavidyā and that Upanişads were considered to be the model texts devoted to this discipline. So on Vátsyayana's reasoning his school was a school of adhyātmavidyā - though one with a distinction. Not that Vātsyāyana could not be mistaken about the intentions of the original Nyāyd authors, but some reasoning like his will alone . explain why prameya is oneof the sixteen Nyāya padārthas and in the manner described. But whatever might have been the intentions of the original Nyaya. authors, the subsequent history of the Nyaya school is the history of a school of logic pure and simple. True, even this school of logic subscribed to a very definite ontology but the details of this ontology were primarily formulated by the sister-school of Vaiseşika; hence it is that the exact nature of the six prameyas thati constitute ontological topics has to be comprehended in the light of what the Vaiseșika school says on the question. Similarly, this. school of logic subscribed to a very definite ethico-theology but the details of this ethico-theology were primarily formulated by the Purāņa specialists; hence it is that the exact nature of the six prameyas that constitute ethical topics has to be comprehended in the light of what the Purāņa specialists say on thequestion. However, even as a school of logic the Nyāya schoolt seems to have had a somewhat chequered history. For as Jaya. nta's procedure convincingly demonstrates, all the problems of logic could be well discussed under the padārtha called pramāna; and so if an exception be made of the padartha called prameya the question naturally arises as to what significance for a school of logic could be had by the fourteen padārthas samsaya etc. The following is the catalogue of these padārthas : samsaya (=doubt), prayojana