Aptamimansa Critique of an Authority Bhasya

Author(s): Samantbhadracharya, Akalankadev, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Jagruti Dilip Sheth Dr

Page 13

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CRITIQUE OF AN AUTHORITY
Astsati. For in this work he undertook a detailed examination of certain one-sided views on certain most burning philosophical questions... Vidyānanda's studies in Anekāntavāda is the most solid contribution to the treasure-house of philosophy. Anekāntavāda is a much misunderstood doctrine and its defence at the hands of incompetent persons only makes matters worse. But Vidyānanda's competence was of a higher order and so his elaboration of the essentials of Anekāntavāda deserves serious study by those who harbour genuine misgivings against this typical Jaina philosophical doctrine,"21
In Yasovijaya's works we reach the highest pinnacle of Anekāntavāda. He had thoroughly mastered the rich heritage. Of his writings the most important are three texts devoted to the problems of Anekāntavāda, viz. Nayarahasya, Anekāntavyavasthā and Nayopadesa. His Astasahasrivivarana, a commentary on Vidyānanda's Astasahasri is noteworthy. Like Vidyānanda he was extermely well-versed in the contemporary systems of Indian philosophy. Besides, he was gifted with a brain whose sharpness and acuteness were unparallelled, this may be due to his mastery over the intricacies of Navya-nyāya. Let us see how he utilises his learning of Navya-nyāya in elucidating and defending the doctrine of Anekānta. "It was an old Jaina position that a thing exists from the standpoint of its own properties while it does not exis. from the standpoint of the alien properties... It constituted the heart of Anekāntavāda doctrine and so the generations of Jaina scholars defended it as best they could. But in Navya-nyāya circles a position similar to the present one began to be maintained. Thus they would speak of 'a thing's absence "limited” by a property not belonging to it' e.g. 'a jar's absence "limited” by clothness (patatvāvadhikaghatābhāvah)'; and it was given out that such an absence of a thing exists even at a place where the thing itself exists. Yaśovijaya aptly pointed out that this amounted to endorsing the Jaina position that a thing as viewed from the standpoint of the alien properties does not exist (i.e. is absent) even at a place where it is seen to exist, it being the case that at this place it exists only as viewed from the standpoint of its own properties... Navya-naiyāyikas would argue that variegated colour is a type sui generis and not just a mechanical juxtaposition of the constituent colours; Yaśovijaya pointed out that in a similar fashion the unity of opposites spoken of by the Jaina is a type sui generis and
21. Ibid, pp. 148-152