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IV, 18.
CONVERSION OF THE SUPPORTER ETC.
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is as faulty as the first assertion; nor has either of the Hetuvidya sastras asserted such a thing as this, till now. 1469
That which depends on nothing cannot as a cause make that which is; but all things round us come from a cause, as the plant comes from the seed; 1470
We cannot therefore say that all things are produced by self-nature. Again, all things which exist (are made) spring not from one (nature) as a cause; 1471
‘And yet you say self-nature is but one, it cannot then be cause of all. If you say that that self-nature pervades and fills all places, 1472
'If it pervades and fills all things, then certainly it cannot make them too; for there would be nothing, then, to make, and therefore this cannot be the cause. 1473
* If, again, it fills all places and yet makes all things that exist, then it should throughout “all time” have made for ever that which is. 1474
But if you say it made things thus, then there is nothing to be made "in time?;" know then for certain self-nature cannot be the cause of all. 1475
'Again, they say that that self-nature excludes all
Southern Buddhists. Någasena wrote a Sastra ('of one sloka') to disprove it.
1 The usual Chinese expression for 'hetuvidya' is 'in ming;' here the phrase is 'ming in;' but I suppose this to be either an error, or equivalent with the other. The Hetuvidya sastra is a treatise on the explanation of causes.'
• The argument seems to be that self-nature must have made all things from the first as they are; there is no room therefore for further creation, but things are still made, therefore self-nature cannot be the cause,
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