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INTRODUCTORY
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the non-absolutistic attitude and its two corollaries viz. the doctrines of different attitudes' (nayas) and ‘sevenfold predication' (saptabhangi) which formed the nucleus of the development of Jaina thought. The Āgamic thought reveals the working of these principles in full measure. We have attempted to give a short account of it in the first chapter. But the account given is by no means full. Complete account of it requires a separate treatise, and so we have refrained from it. It can be said in general that the Jaina mind was always open to receive the alien thoughts without any distortion and assimilate them with their own. This fact was due to more than one reason. Firstly, the Jaina logical thought had a comparatively late origin, and so the non-Jaina thinkers had already asserted their position even before the Jaina thinkers came to the arena. The Jainas had a lot to learn and assimilate. Secondly, they had to argue their own case before the hostile thinkers with a measure of efficiency and critical outlook before they could hope to get a patient hearing from their opponents who would naturally refuse to listen to their arguments unless they embodied correct appreciation and fair criticism. Thirdly, many of the first-rate Jaina thinkers such as Siddhasena, Samantabhadra, Akalanka, Haribhadra and others were converts from learned Brāhmins and had first-hand knowledge of the non-Jaina systems of thought. This helped correct estimate and comparative understanding. Lastly-and this is the most important reason, the Jaina attitude was non-absolutistic, and its scope was wide enough to assimilate such theories as were based upon reason and truth.
Along with this comparative understanding, the Jaina thinkers had a critical disposition towards their own theories. The Āgamic position regarding mati (sensuous) and śruta (scriptural) knowledge, avadhi (visual intuition) and manahparyāya (intuition of mental modes), and kevala-jñāna (perfect knowledge) and kevala-darśana (perfect intuition) was reoriented by Siddhasena Divākara. Jinabhadra took great pains to reinstate the Āgamic position. Bhatta Akalanka and Vidyānandi also were original thinkers and made valuable contribution to the theory. The task of reconciling Siddhasena Divākara and Jinabhadra was left to Upadhyāya Yašovijaya whose thought also was not without its marks of originality. We shall substantiate these remarks in the course of our study.
Besides this theory of knowledge, the Jaina Āgamas contain also the materials for the logical theory of valid knowledge (pramāna). The Anuyogadvāra Sūtradivides valid knowledge (pramāna) into
hliad peopledge (pramana),
BhSü, V. 3. 192; SthSü, 338. The former mentions four kinds of pramāņas viz. pratyakşa, anumāna, aupamya and agama. The Sthānānga mentions the same four categories under the name hetu.
2 ADU, PP. 194-202.
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