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188
PROBLEM OF AVIDYA
[CH.
But the whole assertion is vitiated by ambiguity. What is the nature of the delusion which is asserted to be the outcome of nescience? Is nescience itself an unreal fiction or a real entity? If it be a fiction it cannot be the cause of illusion of imperceptibility or of duality, because a non-entity cannot have any causal efficiency. If on the other hand it is believed to be real, that amounts to the admission of dualism. So whatever be the line of approach or the angle of vision by which the denial of dualism of spirit and matter and the affirmation of the absolute unity of reality may be sought to be established the result becomes nothing but self-contradiction. If the monist is to prove his position by appeal to an accredited organ of knowledge, he unwittingly affirms the reality of two things: the Absolute and the proof of it. The Jaina refuses to agree with the Vedāntist that truth can be established by falsehood which is the postulate of the Vedāntist when he declares the whole logical and epistemological apparatus to be the figment of illusion.
Furthermore, monism can be established only by the negation of dualism. In fact, Sankara, the founder of the school of monistic Vedānta, has called his philosophy the doctrine of non-dualism. The expression ‘non-dualism' can convey an intelligible meaning only if dualism be understood. Now 'dualism' is a whole expression and stands for a whole concept. It can be asserted as a universal proposition that the negation of a whole concept presupposes the reality of the concept in some other context. Of course, there are such expressions as 'a square-circle' which do not stand for anything real, and its negation by such a negative expression as 'a non-square-circle' cannot be thought to presuppose the reality of the negatum. But this does no invalidate the universal proposition 'The negatum is always real'. The rule holds only in the case of whole words and whole concepts. A square-circle is only an attempt at combination of square and circle, and it becomes a fiction because the two concepts are mutually repellent. It is for this reason that the rule is propounded to hold good of whole concepts quâ negata. Now monism quâ negation of dualism is possible only if dualism be a false appearance. But dualism being a whole concept its negation will necessarily presuppose the reality of the negatum (sc. dualism) in some context or other.2
The Vedāntist however is not convinced by such linguistic arguments. Even if dualism is regarded as a concept, its negation cannot be made the ground of its ontological reality. The negation of dualism does not in reality belong to the Absolute. The whole
1 mohasyä 'vidyārūpasyā 'kiñcidrūpatve pāroksya-hetutvághatanāt sadvitiyatvadarśana-nibandhanatvāsambhavāt, tasya vastu-rūpatve dvaitasiddhiprasaktes tata eva pārokşya-sadvitiyatvayor badhanāt pumarthe niścitam śästram' ity etasyā 'pi dvaita-sādhanatvät... Ibid.
2 See ĀMi, 27.
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