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III. X111]
CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHIST AVIDYA
209
holds that our cognitions are momentary and self-intuited and that there are other subjects. Certainly all these facts cannot be proved by our intuitions. A cognition may be felt by itself, but it is not felt as momentary or as not cognized by another which is the meaning of self-intuition. Moreover, if the cognition has no veridical reference to a real extra-subjective fact, how can the subjectivist believe in the existence of other subjects? The denial of genuine extra-subjective reference must end in solipsism. If the entire logical apparatus including the difference of probans and probandum and the necessary relation between them be a false creation of nescience, then the subjectivist cannot prove anything including his own position. The subjectivist seeks to establish the identity of content with cognition on the ground of the two being felt together. But this very assertion proves that he believes in the duality of cognition and content. Is this not a case of self-contradiction like the vocal statement of a person 'I am an observer of the vow of silence'? It has however been argued in defence by the subjectivist that this line of attack on the part of the opponent is neither fair nor consistent. How can the charge of a fallacy or a self-contradiction be advanced against the subjectivist when the opponent knows that the former does not believe in the reality of anything other than consciousness? It might be said in defence that these adverse criticisms are not unreasonable or illegitimate so long as the subjectivist has not proved his position. The latter also has recourse to the logical apparatus to prove his position to the satisfaction of the opponent. And he is on the same level with the opponent so far as the belief in the validity of logical weapons is concerned. The use of logic will become superfluous after the ultimate truth viz. the reality of consciousness alone is realized. Dignāga and his followers in spite of their ultimate conviction of the truth of pure consciousness alone have elaborated logical weapons and this is not inconsistent with their philosophical convictions. They have frankly avowed that logic has its place and utility only on this side of realization of the ultimate truth and is necessary to combat the prevailing misconceptions of philosophers. So the charge of self-contradiction or inconsistency is nothing better than argumentum ad hominem.
The Jaina philosopher observes that his charges could be ineffective if the Buddhist idealist succeeded in proving that his conclusion was established by an unimpeachable logical ground. Dharmakirti asserts that the 'identity' of cognition and content follows from the 'necessity of their being known together' (sahopalambha-niyamāt). But what is the meaning of the expression 'the necessity of being known together and of the term 'identity'? The former may possibly be interpreted
1..... sadā mauna-vratiko 'ham ity abhilāpavat sva-vaçanavirodhasyai 'va svikaranāt-Astasahasri, p. 242.
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