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III. XIV]
CRITICISM OF THE SAIVA AVIDYA
215
which belong to other entities, then there will be no meaning in the assertion that the characteristics belong to things. If, on the other hand, they are identical, either the attribute or the substantive will be left over. This seems to be incontestable from the standpoint of pure logic. But as pure logic is not found to be obeyed by the facts which are revealed to our experience which again is the only source of our knowledge of the existence and behaviour of things, the Jaina philosopher who is equally attentive to the claims of logic and experience is not convinced by this flourish of pure logic. He asserts 'Certainly the characteristics are different from the substantives. But because they always go together and are inseparably related, this shows that the relation is not one of absolute difference which obtains between the characteristics of A and B. The characteristics of A are not different from A in the same way as the characteristics of B are. This shows that the relation is also not opposed to identity. This identity is not exclusive of difference. To be precise, the relation is sui generis just like that between cause and effect. You may call it identity-indifference because the two elements are felt in it. But it is not exhausted by both of them or analysable into these two elements. The relation is unanalysable though it is distinguishable in thought as consisting of identity and difference as elements. But, as we have observed, the relation is altogether of a different kind from both because while it synthesizes them it is not exhausted by them. It is a relation which embraces identity and difference in its fold, and also transcends them because it is more than an aggregate of the two. In this way the Jaina solves all the puzzles and cruxes invented by the votary of pure logic. He asserts that the nature of reality is to be determined not by experience alone, nor exclusively by logic. The two must co-operate. And thus the Jaina is not an adherent of uncritical experience, nor is he enamoured of logic alone. Logic is blind without experience and the latter again is a cripple without the criticism offered by logic. One must be tempered by the other. Thus the Jaina is not a blind empiricist but a critical realist who subjects experience to logic and chastens logic by the unmistakable verdict of experience.
Let us now estimate the value of the Saiva conception of avidyā.
XIV
CRITICISM OF THE SAIVA CONCEPTION OF AVIDYA
The conception of bondage and emancipation is the common property of all Indian systems of thought. It is recognized that the present world and our condition and status are not perfect and there
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