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III. X11]
CRITICISM OF THE VEDANTA AVIDYA
199
continuity and consequently the absence of lapse from uniformity are the true characteristic of a real. But these tests are incapable of being applied to the objects of experience. Things are seen to come into existence and pass out of being and this means that there is neither constancy nor uniformity in them. The conclusion is inevitable that they cannot be real.
The Jaina philosopher has not concealed his surprise at this endeavour of the Vedāntist to formulate a conception of reality which is entirely opposed to experience. What is the source of the knowledge of this peculiar nature of reality? The ultimate nature of things can be known by experience alone. Well, what is the ground for our belief that consciousness is existent and also is the proof of the existence of other things? The answer must be that it is felt to be so. Consciousness is its own guarantor and proof of its own reality. As regards unconscious matter, its existence is established by means of consciousness. It cannot be asked why consciousness should be selfevidenced and matter be dependent upon consciousness for the proof of its existence. The question is a question of fact, and not of reason. The nature of thing is inalienable and must be accepted to be what it is. Can anybody answer why fire should be hot and water cold, and not vice versa? No, because it is a question of fact. Similarly the nature of reality is to be deduced from the testimony of experience. The existence of things which are experienced is obvious and selfevident. If you call in question their credentials, the fact of existence and consciousness which are posited by the Vedāntist to be the ultimate reality will not also be immune from such doubting interrogation. The result will be unrelieved scepticism or universal negation. The Vedāntist had the good sense and sanity not to acquiesce in this suicidal estimation. The Jaina would respectfully and earnestly ask the Vedāntist to carry his determination of reality consistently to its natural conclusion. He accepts existence to be the ultimate truth solely on the testimony of experience. But as experience records change as the integral character of existence or rather of things felt to be existent, it beats one's understanding why change should be declared as unreal appearance. The Vedāntist has contended that change involves lapse of being into non-being and this is a case of self-contradiction. Reality must not be self-contradictory. But as change is fraught with contradiction, it is to be unceremoniously thrown overboard as an unreal and unjustifiable appearance. The Jaina is a frank realist, and is candid in his confession of faith in the verdict of experience. The Vedāntist thinks that there is pure being which is incompatible with pure non being. But pure being is an abstraction, and we have no experience of it. So also is the case with pure non-being. What we find in
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