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[CH.
several distinct factors the agent, the act and the object and also the purpose and so on. But this plurality is itself an appearance and hence a case of superimposition. Unless the self feels that it is the body it cannot act. Action is possible only for the body, and the self can appear to act or believe itself to be the agent only if it identifies itself with the body. The maxim is that the attribute of one can belong to the other only if there is identity between the two-identity being understood as a relation which is different from difference. Our actions are for the fulfilment of our own purpose. If we could find that we are acting simply for the interests of those that have nothing in common with ourselves, we would forthwith stop functioning. If one realized that one had nothing in common with one's body or the sense-organs, one would at once stop all activities for their preservation. The function of knowing also depends upon the adhyasa. Sankara says: 'One free from the notions of 'I' and 'mine' with reference to the body, sense-organs etc. is incapable of being a subject of knowledge (pramātā) and thus the activity of knowing is impossible for him. The activity of perception and the like is not possible without the owning up of the sense-organs. Nor are the sense-organs capable of acting without the substratum (viz. the body). Nor can one take to activity without superimposing one's self upon the body. Nor in the absence of all this can an absolutely unrelated self become the subject of knowledge. And without the subject there can be no activity of knowledge. It, therefore, follows, that all such activities as perceptual knowledge and spiritual enquiries are possible only with reference to one possessed of avidya." This transcendental adhyasa is common to both the animal and the human world, and lasts until the Self (Atman) is realized and all subject-object relationship disappears. It is this avidya that is the seed of worldly life. This is Sankara's conception of avidya. Now let us turn to his conception of māyā.
We have briefly referred to Sankara's critique of the nature of our experience. It was found on analysis that mutual identification of the self and the not-self is the foundation of experience. But now the problem is: Why does this duality of self and not-self appear at all? Is there any separate entity called not-self? The answer of the Vedanta to such a question is well known. Duality is false. There is only One Self without a second. What is then this not-self? Why does it appear? In other words, why is there this world of phenomena? The analysis of experience shows that we refer everything to one constant and abiding Self although mostly we do so unknowingly. We unknowingly identify the Self with the world and the world with
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PROBLEM OF AVIDYA
1 dehendriyādiṣv aham-mama-'bhimana-rahitasya .. tasmād avidyavadviṣayāṇy eva pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni śāstrāņi ca-Ibid.
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