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170
PROBLEM OF AVIDYA
[CH.
condition of the world order but, in association with the eternal Brahman, is the material cause of the world also. Brahman, being limitless existence, consciousness, and bliss with no difference, intrinsic and extrinsic, in its being, is a unity perfect, solid, and simple. The plurality of the phenomenal world, which is experienced by all and sundry, and the existence of which is not liable to be repudiated without blatant self-contradiction, cannot be deduced from the simple homogeneous unity. The Vedāntists accordingly postulate an allpervading māyā, which is the principle of cosmic illusion, and accord it a timeless status along with Brahman, although it is recognized to be liable to destruction and as such held to be a subordinate adjunct to the Absolute with which it is associated. The Sankhya conception of prakyti is accepted in toto with this essential reservation that it is held to be subordinate to the Absolute, independently of whom it has no existence, and is again held to be quasi-real in character. It is not real like the Absolute though it is unborn like it, because it is subject to annihilation. But it is not an unreal fiction as it has causal efficiency which a fiction cannot have. Thus it is held to be neither ultimately real nor absolutely unreal and thus eludes logical determination. Logic demands that if A is not real it must be unreal. But mäyä as the basis of the cosmos, subjective and objective, is not capable of being classed under either of these exclusive heads. Its existence is not liable to be repudiated because it is a felt fact. Though logically indeterminable as a real, and not capable of being dismissed as an unreal fiction without contradiction of experience, the actuality of the world appearance and consequently māyā as its presupposition has got to be acquiesced in, however offensive it may appear to our logical thought.
The Vedāntist holds that reality must be rational and logically consistent. Only that is real which possesses existence as an intrinsic and inalienable character. The real is that which exists on its own account and in its own right. It cannot be made real by anything external. The real therefore cannot lapse from its reality, and so cannot change, because change implies the cessation of a previous state and the accrual of a novel condition. But as the sole character of a real is its reality, the cessation of any element in it will mean the lapse of reality and the acquisition of a character which was not real before. This means that a real can cease to exist and an unreal can come into being. There is obvious contradiction in this conception and so the Vedāntists affirm that change is not predicable of the ultimate reality. But change is a felt fact, and has to be accounted for. The Vedāntist asserts that change and all that it connotes do not belong to reality, but they appear in and upon the Absolute owing to its association with māyā which is responsible for the appearance of multiplicity and plurality in spite of the fact that they cannot be real. Reality is again defined to be one
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