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184
PROBLEM OF AVIDYA
[CH.
of the subject, the probans, and the probandum is the very condition of the conclusion. So you start with the difference of the probans and the probandum as the premise and seek to deduce the unity of them as the conclusion. If you assert that the difference is only an illusion you cannot make it the ground of a true conclusion. Even if it be admitted for the sake of argument that the integration of the cognitum with consciousness proves its unity with the self, yet the difference between the probans and the probandum cannot be repudiated. The argument of the Vedāntist was: The cognitum is incorporated within consciousness because it is felt as coincident with the latter (sc. consciousness). Now the act of cognition and the content are asserted to be integrated and incorporated with the self and this is the probandum and the fact of the content being coincident with the cognition is made the probans. Even if the validity of the conclusion be allowed, the numerical difference of the probans and probandum remains unrefuted, and this militates against monism. The Vedāntist however asserts in defence that there is no difficulty as the dualism of the probans and the probandum is not presupposed as the condition. The two are identical, and yet they can serve as the probans and probandum just as is the case with existence and momentariness in the Buddhist argument. Things are momentary because they are existent. The probans is existence and the probandum is momentariness. It must be admitted that momentariness and existence are not ontologically different though conceptually they appear to be distinct. Likewise, the Vedāntist does not believe in the ontological difference of the probans and probandum though in empirical thought they are conceived to be different owing to the influence of nescience.
The Jaina realist avers that the assertion of ontological identity between the probans and the probandum has no justification. The Vedāntist seeks to deduce the identity of the content and cognition logically from the felt coincidence of the two. The fact that they are felt as two should have made the Vedāntist pause before he drew the conclusion of their absolute identity. If experience be the determinant of the nature of things it cannot be gainsaid that not only the probans and the probandum are felt as identical-cum-different, but also the conclusion viz. the integration of the content should be regarded as a case of identity-in-difference. Even the probans and probandum (sc. existence and momentariness) in the Buddhist argument are not felt as absolutely identical. The fact that one goes with the other necessarily is proof that they are not absolutely distinct and different. But the other fact that one is the probans and the other is the probandum, and as such is felt as distinct from the other should prove that the two are
1 Cf. sabdādau sattvānityatvayor api kathañcit tādātmyät sarvathā tādātmyāsiddheh, tatsiddhau sādhya-sādhana-bhāva-virodhāt-Ibid.
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